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Essays
The Legal Codes of Ancient Israel*
Michael Walzer
Notice the plural form: it is not only that the bible contains many laws,
but also and more importantly that it contains three different legal codes.
The many laws are easy to understand, and it is equally easy to under-
stand the popular wish that the yoke of the covenant be less onerous. An
old folktale claims that on the day after the Sinai revelation, the Israelites
rose early and marched at double speed away from the mountain so that
they would not be given any more laws.I This did them no good.
Through history the laws kept piling up-not, however in the form of
explicit additions and revisions to the covenant code, Exodus 20-23, but
in the form of two new codes: the holiness code of Leviticus and the
Deuteronomic code. Each of these is described as if it too had been
delivered at Sinai, and yet no sustained or systematic effort is made, early
or late, not even at the time of canonization, to harmonize Leviticus and
* © Michael Walzer, 1992. This essay was first presented as the Robert Cover Memorial
Lecture at Yale Law School in November, 1991. I am grateful to the commentators who joined me
on that occasion and to the editors and manuscript readers of this journal for many helpful
suggestions. Biblical citations follow the form of Tanakh: A New Translation of the Holy Scriptures
According to the Traditional Hebrew Text (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985) with
some modifications.
1. Louis Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, trans. Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: Jewish
Publication Society, 1910), 3: 242.
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Deuteronomy with Exodus. The three codes are significantly different in
the range of social activities that they cover, the style in which they are
written, and the substantive rules they establish. Yet all of them are
divinely commanded by the same God. There has not been a succession
of gods, each with his own law, as in other countries of the ancient Near
East there was a succession of kings promulgating new and different legal
codes, the most recent one replacing the one before. How can difference
be explained when a single divine lawgiver rules eternally?
Trying to answer this question will lead me to ask a number of others,
focused on the biblical writers' understanding of the law. I am less inter-
ested in the laws themselves with all their prescriptions and prohibitions
than in the legal culture of ancient Israel, insofar as this can be read out
of the biblical texts (we have no other sources, no court records, no
independent accounts of procedures or cases). What emerges from the
texts is a picture of a culture unusually pluralistic and a set of laws less
subject to sovereign power and professional specialization than our own.
The argumentative legalism of classical and medieval Jewry has its ori-
gins here-in the biblical codes and in the efforts of men and women,
over many years, to live by them or to revise or escape them. But it is
only the origins and not the later development that concerns me in this
essay. For there is much to be learned from Israel's singular revelation,
delivered by one divine lawgiver, recorded and preserved in three
versions.
The documentary thesis provides an historical explanation of this
"tripleness," which in its most general form I am inclined to accept: the
three codes represent three different traditions, oral or written, dating
from different periods, transmitted by different groups, brought together
at some late date by unknown editors. I will draw upon this thesis in the
course of my own argument, but it does not answer what is surely the
hard and interesting question. Why were the different traditions brought
together, set side by side, rather than serially replaced or rewritten and
harmonized? How can we explain the survival of all three?
From a theological point of view, the three codes are literally inexplic-
able-and that is why the differences among them are never acknowl-
edged in the text. No human lawmaking is recognized; hence there are
no stipulated procedures for adding to the divinely revealed law or for
revising it, let alone for replacing it. The rule of Deuteronomy 4:2, "You
shall not add anything to what I command you or take anything away
from it, but keep the commandments of the Lord," applies also, in princi-
ple, to the covenant code of Exodus and ought to have precluded the
writing of Deuteronomy itself. And yet the writing went on and, as
Michael Fishbane has demonstrated in an immensely learned study of
"inner-biblical legal exegesis," argument, interpretation, and revision, in
[Vol. 4: 335
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law courts and scribal schools, went along with it.2 As soon as the first
code was made known, a process began of adding and subtracting. In a
sense, this is an entirely normal process of adaptation to social change.
But since it is an unacknowledged process, it cannot have an acknowl-
edged outcome. The adding and subtracting is surreptitious, and the
result is a "divine word" inconsistent with itself.
It may well be, as some scholars think, that Deuteronomy was
intended by its authors to replace earlier formulations of God's law-a
self-conscious attempt to provide a new and alternative text. In fact, the
authors provided an additional text, which does not supplant but rather
co-exists with the earlier versions. The case is the same here as in the
historical writings: the authors of Chronicles probably meant to replace
the books of Samuel and Kings with their own expurgated history, heav-
ily emphasizing the temple cult and the role of the priesthood. They
must have hoped for readers who would find only their account avail-
able. But what they got from the beginning were readers like ourselves,
for whom Chronicles is simply another account, oddly different from
Samuel and Kings, but co-existing with it and laying claim to the same
authority. The written history of God's people, like the codifications of
God's law, cannot be supplanted. Each version pretends to be the only
one, even though the quickest reading of the bible as a whole exposes the
pretense.
The failure of every attempt at replacement and the piling up of differ-
ent versions of law and history give the bible its special character. It is as
if God presides over and therefore validates the different versions and
also, necessarily, the disagreements they reflect. The disagreements can-
not be openly recognized, but they also cannot be harmonized or written
out of the text. They make further exegesis imperative since legal deci-
sions and political and religious policies have to be justified in textual
terms. New exegesis gives rise in turn to new disagreements. And again,
because they cannot be acknowledged, the new disagreements also can-
not be resolved.
The biblical text camouflages, as Fishbane writes, "the dependence of
the divine word upon its human transmission and interpretation."4 The
camouflage conceals the divergence of interpretations and it also conceals
the identities, the proper names and the social location, of the rival inter-
preters. Though we know the names of all the high priests and some of
the royal scribes, the authors of the priestly code and of Deuteronomy
are necessarily anonymous: officially, as it were, they do not exist. And
2. Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
3. Joseph Blenkinsopp, in Wisdom & Law in the Old Testament: The Ordering of Life in Israel
and Early Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 94, argues that Deuteronomy
represents the first effort to create a "canonical" text-that is, a text that becomes the sole basis of
continuing commentary and interpretation.
4. Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 272.
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because the interpreters cannot be identified, they cannot be ranked; it is
not possible to establish the authority of some of them over others. So
far as the text is concerned, the only author is God himself. But behind
this God, covered by his authority and speaking in his name, stands a
host of human authors who make the law by writing, reading, comment-
ing on, and applying it. Priests, judges, scribes, and prophets: only the
last of these tell us who they are and announce a new divine word; the
others (the prophets, too, most of the time) read and revise the old
words. No one has a monopoly on the production of new legal versions.
Or, better, God's monopoly works against the consolidation of interpre-
tive power in Israelite society and serves to legitimize the plurality of
interpreters. These are the secret legislators of Israel. Had there been no
doctrine of the divine word, their work would probably have been nor-
malized, and some political or religious group would have seized control,
establishing a monopoly on legal interpretation. But there could be no
normalization so long as denial and, except for the prophets, anonymity
were religiously required.
Eventually, centuries after the last of the biblical texts were written,
the rabbis managed to establish an interpretive (and even, on some
accounts, a legislative) monopoly-occasionally challenged, as by the
medieval Karaites, but wonderfully effective over many years and across
most of the diaspora. But this achievement depended on the claim that
the law was now a human possession, no longer God's to give. Citing a
line from Deuteronomy, the rabbis declared that "it is not in the heav-
ens" (30:12), that is, its meaning had to be determined here on earth, by a
majority of this or that rabbinic court.' What the Deuteronomic authors
meant by this line, however, was something very different. They wanted
to say that the law was easy to know, readily available not for interpreta-
tion but for obedience. One had only to study their text. They did not
give the law an earthly location in order to justify their own legislative
activity, for they did not, could not, acknowledge that activity. And
therefore they could not prevent other people from doing-so long as the
doing was denied-what they had done.
II
Hence the three codes (and many scattered examples of independently
announced law and legal exegesis)-all of them equally valid and simul-
taneously in force. The earliest is the covenant code of Exodus, which
was probably, in one form or another, the law of the tribal confederation
and the first kings.6 Like the other codes, this one is nothing like a com-
5. Baba Metzia 59b.
6. For an argument about the three codes and their probable historical settings, see Blenkinsopp,
Wisdom and Law, chapters 4 and 5.
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plete set of laws, and scholars have as yet found no principles of inclusion
or arrangement. Leviticus is mostly new law, though its central section,
the "holiness code" of chapters 19-25, goes over much of the ground
covered in Exodus. The intense concern with sacrifice and purity sug-
gests priestly authorship; the work was probably begun in the days of the
first Temple but not finished, so most scholars claim, until the second
Temple had been built and its cult established. It seems clear, though,
that whoever wrote Deuteronomy knew many of the laws recorded in
Leviticus, which must have existed in some earlier version by the seventh
century. If Deuteronomy is, as Moshe Weinfeld has argued, the work of
royal scribes (or of some group of scribes patronized by reformers in the
court), then we have to imagine two contemporary but rival schools of
secret legislators, writing new laws, revising old laws, and claiming that
their work, too, had been delivered by God to Moses at Sinai.7
Deuteronomy is the crown of Israel's law: so, at least, academic com-
mentators commonly conclude, sensing, perhaps, that the book is the
work of writers rather like themselves. Principles of inclusion and
arrangement are no more evident here than elsewhere,8 but the book as a
whole has the form of an intellectual composition, elaborately rhetorical,
somewhat verbose, didactic, and-the anachronism is useful-ideologi-
cal. Leviticus reads like a record of priestly practice, no doubt idealized.
Deuteronomy is more programmatic, aiming self-consciously at religious
and perhaps also at political reformation. Its laws have been called pro-
phetic, humanitarian, secular, liberal, redistributive, and even feminist-
though many of them seem remarkably unsuited to such adjectives. In
any case, if Exodus is the law of the tribes, and Leviticus the law of the
temple, Deuteronomy is the law of the nation or, more specifically per-
haps, of the royal court and the capital city, which stand for the nation.
We might think of it (anachronistically, again) as one of the earliest
examples in Western history of the work of urban intellectuals.
It has often been said that Israelite law-the three codes taken
together-is more "advanced," that is, more humanitarian, liberal, and
so on, than that of other ancient peoples. Something like this is, indeed,
the claim of the Deuteronomists themselves, who have Moses ask the
assembled Israelites: "And what great nation has laws and rules as right-
eous as all this law that I set before you this day?" (Deut. 4:8).9 Moses
acknowledges here that other nations have legal codes, even if these are
7. Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1972), 179-89.
8. This has not deterred attempts to find or invent ordering principles that will account for the
text as we have it. See, for example, Calum M. Carmichael, The Laws of Deuteronomy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1974).
9. The text reads as if the author has a comparison or even a set of comparisons in mind, but it is
impossible to say what other nations he is thinking of. For a modern comparison, arguing to a
similar conclusion, see Leon Epsztein, Social Justice in the Ancient Near East and the People of the
Bible, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1986).
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less righteous than Israel's; the others are not barbarians, like Kipling's
"lesser breeds without the law." But they do not apparently receive their
law directly from God. The seven Noachide laws are an invention of the
rabbis. Except for the commandment of Genesis 9:6-"Whosoever sheds
the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed: for in His image did
God make man"-there is no biblical account of a divine revelation to
humankind generally or to the "nations," but only to Israel. Curiously,
it is just this universal law against murder, as Moshe Greenberg has
shown, that distinguishes Israel's criminal code from all the others that
we know of in the ancient world. The other codes allow for monetary
compensation in cases of murder, while the bible insists on capital pun-
ishment."° Whether this is more righteous or more humanitarian is an
open question, though the apparently related refusal of biblical legislators
to punish crimes against property with death is certainly likely to appeal
to modem readers.
In any case, the discovery and translation of more and more legal
codes from both Mesopotamia and Asia Minor requires us to be skeptical
of all apologetic and moralizing comparisons. It seems to be true that
the rhetorical stress on social justice that marks the biblical codes has no
precedent elsewhere-and the power of the prophetic writings, denounc-
ing injustice, is also unequaled among Israel's neighbors: at least, nothing
so strong has yet been found. Yet the substance of the biblical laws,
especially the laws dealing with family and economy, is not in any sense
singular or original; Israel's legislators were clearly working within a
common Near Eastern legal tradition. The protection they provided for
the weak-slaves, strangers, women-is sometimes greater than that pro-
vided in other ancient codes, sometimes not. The penalties they pre-
scribed for violations of the laws are sometimes more lenient, sometimes
more harsh. Social differentiation is considerably more rigid in the Baby-
lonian laws than it is in Israel's, but national differences were more sig-
nificant in Israel than in Babylonia.
III
What is special about biblical law is not its substance but its sources
and its presentation. I have already said something about divine prove-
nance and the unexpectedly pluralizing effects of God's sole authorship.
But there is also a more narrowly political point to be made about divine
revelation-and then two points about the textual presentation of the
law.
First, Israel's law is God's alone; it has no other possessive modifier.
10. I follow here the argument of Moshe Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal
Law," in Frederick Greenspahn, Essential Papers on Israel and the Ancient Near East (New York:
New York University Press, 1991), 333-52.
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Above all, and in contrast to all the other Near Eastern codes, it is not
the king's law. Despite the rich narrative accounts of Israel's monarchic
period, writes Martin Noth, "we nowhere hear of the law-giving activity
of the kings."" Nor is the law ever described as the work of an assembly
of elders; nor, again, as a priestly codification, or a philosophical con-
struction, or a judicial invention. Justice Holmes's maxim, that law is
what the judges say it is, may in fact apply to ancient Israel as well as to
modern America, but it would have been a literally inadmissible proposi-
tion among biblical writers. Politically, this means that everyone-kings,
elders, priests, judges-is subject, indeed equally subject, to the authority
of the law. This is a matter of principle. The actual power relations
prevailing in the community at any given time, of course, qualify or dis-
tort the expression of the principle. Nonetheless, principles are impor-
tant, as we can see from the story of Ahab and Naboth in I Kings 21.
Ahab, who rules the northern kingdom of Israel, covets the vineyard
of Naboth, which adjoins his palace grounds. He proposes to buy it,
offering a "better vineyard" or a money payment. Naboth refuses, saying
"The Lord forbid that I should give up to you the inheritance of my
fathers." Ahab can do nothing: he goes home "dispirited and sullen,"
takes to his bed, turns his face to the wall. His wife, Jezebel, a Phoeni-
cian woman who worships Baal rather than Yahweh and does not know
or respect Israel's law, contrives Naboth's murder. Ahab then seizes the
vineyard and is confronted by the prophet Elijah, demanding "Would
you murder and take possession?" (I Kings 21:19). It is a wonderful
scene, but I am more interested in Ahab's dispiritedness than in Elijah's
righteous anger. The king implicitly acknowledges the laws of land ten-
ure and thinks himself constrained by them. No way of changing the law
is available to him.
The only people who might openly challenge and change the law are
the prophets, who claim a direct relation to God. Moses, the first
prophet, with the most direct relation, does add to the law he originally
delivered-but only by bringing a case "before the Lord" (Numbers
27:5) and waiting until "the decision of the Lord should be declared"
(Leviticus 24:12). The first of these passages is especially interesting
because the case in question is initiated by the "daughters of
Zelophehad," who speak before the congregation of Israel defending
their right to inherit their father's land. God tells Moses that their plea is
just and commands him to announce a new inheritance law.12 The
daughters seem more important here than the prophet, and the scene in
which they appear suggests how the narrator views the accessibility of
legal procedures and the popular character of legal argument. But the
11. Martin Noth, The Laws in the Pentatench (London: SCM Press, 1984), 14.
12. But the daughters' victory is later compromised. See Numbers 36, and the discussion in
Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation, 98-99, 104-05.
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law is never again disputed so publicly. Nor did the later prophets have
the authority to revise it in this open way.
Indeed, I know of only one passage in all the prophetic writings that
seems to set the living word of the prophet against the written law. Here
is Jeremiah speaking to the people of Jerusalem:
How can you say, "We are wise,
And we possess the law of the Lord"?
Assuredly, for naught has the pen labored,
For naught the scribes!
The wise shall be put to shame,
Shall be dismayed and caught;
See, they reject the word of the Lord,
So their wisdom amounts to nothing (8:8-9).
These lines are both unusual and obscure: there is no specific "instruc-
tion" of the scribes that the prophet denies or cancels. He is probably
more concerned with scribal wisdom than with the legal code. A better
example of the prophet's relation to the law is provided by Jeremiah
17:21-22, where the laws of the Sabbath are amended or, as Jeremiah
claims, elaborated: "Guard yourselves.., against carrying burdens (or
merchandise) on the Sabbath day, and bringing them through the gates
of Jerusalem." No prohibition of "carrying" is recorded in the three
codes."3 But Jeremiah quickly adds: "Hallow the Sabbath, as I com-
manded your fathers," thus reading his amendment back into the origi-
nal law. The prophet too is bound by the law; he cannot play the part of
Max Weber's charismatic leader who proclaims: "The law is thus and
so, but I say unto you. .. ." Still, prophets do change the law without
acknowledging what they are doing; and so do priests and scribes and
judges. Kings cannot even do that; they can only break the law. They
can put their hands on it, violently, but they cannot leave their intellec-
tual or moral mark on it.14
IV
The second distinctive feature of Israelite law is its radical embedded-
ness in a historical narrative. It is as if our own criminal and civil law
were available to us only in repetitious but always slightly dissimilar
passages interspersed throughout a history of the American Revolution.
This historicism in part determines, in part qualifies, the law. Since the
biblical narrative stretches only from the exodus to the conquest, Israe-
lite kings play no part in it and, except for Deuteronomy 17, which antic-
ipates and regulates kingly rule, they make no appearance in the legal
13. The case from Exodus 16:17-20 and Numbers 15:32-36 has to do with "gathering," not
carrying.
14. One "statute" having to do with the equal division of booty is attributed to David in I
Samuel 30:25, but this was before David became king.
[Vol. 4: 33 5
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texts. So it is not surprising that they are not among the acknowledged
or even the unacknowledged interpreters of the law. Solomon is cele-
brated for wisdom, not legal knowledge. The account of deliverance
from Egyptian slavery is the textual setting for an anti-authoritarian and
a justice-oriented legalism. Future generations of Israelites are enjoined
not only to study the law but also to retell the history. The legal texts
refer regularly to the historical narrative and so invite interpretation in
its terms. Hence the special force of the commandments about slaves,
strangers, the poor and needy, widows and orphans. Babylonian and
Assyrian kings, in the preambles to their own law codes, insist upon the
protection they offer to these same groups, perhaps with reason. Yet this
is noblesse oblige, the special task of the mighty. In Israel this task seems
to be democratized; at least, it is rooted in a common experience of
oppression and therefore available for democratization. When Amos, for
example, denounces the practices he calls "grinding the face of the
poor," he addresses himself to all Israel, not to the leaders of the
community.
I hasten to add that the experience of Egyptian bondage did not lead
Israelite legislators to abolish slavery. According to the covenantal and
Deuteronomic codes, Hebrew slaves cannot be held longer than six years,
a rule that effectively turns slavery into a form of limited indenture (Exo-
dus 21:2-6; Deuteronomy 15:12-18-these two texts differ with regard to
female slaves, a point I will come back to below). Nothing is said in
either code about foreign slaves, however, for whom the seventh year
presumably brings no release. Leviticus is explicit in permitting the per-
manent enslavement of foreigners: "they shall be your bondmen forever"
(25:46), which must be the way Egypt's pharaoh thought about the chil-
dren of Israel. Curiously, the Levitical standard for the treatment of the
Israelite "bondman" is set by what appears to be an ethnically undiffer-
entiated class: he is to be treated "as a hired servant and a sojourner."
He must serve and sojourn, however, for forty-nine years, until the jubi-
lee, rather than for only six years from the date of his purchase. He
cannot be treated as harshly as a (foreign) slave since he belongs, along
with all "free" Israelites, to God. Deuteronomy also recognizes the
interethnic class of "hired servants" (wage workers) and explicitly
demands equal treatment for all its members: "You shall not oppress a
needy and destitute laborer whether a fellow countryman or a stran-
ger. . ." (24:14). Here the experience of Egyptian bondage is given a
general application: "But you shall remember that you were a slave in
Egypt." The Deuteronomic commandment not to return a fugitive slave
("He shall dwell with you in any place which he may choose. . ." [23:16])
seems also to apply to foreigners, though scholars disagree about its exact
1992]
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V
The differences among the laws of slavery suggest an extended and
serious argument-entirely appropriate in a community with a shared
memory of bondage. The argument must have been as much about the
experience as about the laws themselves: what moral and legal conse-
quences followed from the remembrance of Egypt? What did it mean to
be a vassal nation, a community of divine servants? To answer questions
like these was to justify one or another understanding of the laws. And
this brings me to the third distinctive feature of Israel's codes: many of
the laws that they include are laws-with-reasons, justified laws. Nothing
like this appears in any of the other Near Eastern legal codes. The great
kings of Mesopotamia did not have to provide arguments for their laws.
Nor, of course, does God. Many of God's laws, like theirs, are delivered
without justification and seem-some of the laws of holiness and purity
provide the clearest examples-entirely arbitrary. But the social and
economic laws often come with reasons attached. Sometimes these refer
directly to the historical narrative: "You shall not oppress a stranger: for
you know the feelings of the stranger, having been strangers in the land
of Egypt" (Exodus 23:9). Sometimes the justifications appeal to a more
ordinary morality or, simply, to common sense:
If you.., take your neighbor's garment to pledge [i.e. as a pawn],
you must return it to him before the sun sets. It is his only clothing,
the sole covering for his skin. In what else will he sleep? (Exodus
22:26-27).
When you build a new house, then you shall make a parapet. For
your roof so that you do not bring bloodguilt on your house, if any-
one should fall from there. (Deuteronomy 22:8).
The distinction between justified and unjustified law is, from a theoret-
ical perspective, far more interesting than the more standard scholarly
distinction between casuistic and apodictic law. Scholars have argued
that the case law is common to the bible and other ancient codes while
the sharp imperatives of the apodictic form ("Thou shalt not . . . .") are
more likely to be unique to Israel. But this is much disputed and of
uncertain significance even if true. What David Weiss Halivni has called
"the Jewish predilection for justified law," if it exists, is genuinely more
important.16 In the biblical texts, the predilection is only intermittently
displayed. The reiterated phrase of Leviticus, "for I am the Lord your
15. Jewish commentators commonly assume that the fugitive is a foreigner. See, for example,
Ramban (Nachmanides), Commentary on the Torah, trans. C. B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1976), 5:
287-88.
16. David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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God," may provide a motive for obeying the laws, but it cannot be said
to provide a substantive justification of their content. Laws-with-reasons
appear often enough, however, to call for an explanation: what is the
reason for the reasons? One possible answer to this question is the
strength of the covenantal idea. Because the covenant requires the peo-
ple's consent, we might say, the laws must be justified. Even though the
people have already given a "wholesale" consent-all that the Lord has
spoken "we will obey" (Exodus 20:16)-Israel's legislators seem unwill-
ing to rely entirely on that. They seek in addition something more spe-
cific and particularized, as if they have in mind a genuinely consensual
community whose members know exactly what they are doing and why.
Yet perhaps the legislators are giving reasons first of all to one another
and only incidentally to other members of the community. Another
explanation of the justifying clauses in the biblical codes is that they
reflect the actual discussions that went on within priestly or scribal or
judicial circles. They are the textual residue of oral advocacy--of what
was actually said in defense of legal reform and revision. The argumen-
tative style of rabbinic law stands, I would suggest, at the end of a contin-
uous development that has its beginnings here. But the beginning is very
different from the end-and much harder for us to understand. How can
we reconstruct the mind-set that governed the earliest Israelite legal
arguments? Whatever the sophistication and, as modem readers are
likely to think, the humanism revealed in the laws such as that of the
pledge, biblical legislators were clearly open, as the rabbis generally were
not, to the idea of direct divine intervention. When God intervened
through the mysterious urim and thummim, for example, he did not give
reasons. The word torah, which usually means instruction, testimony,
law, or decision, also means oracle. Both priests and prophets delivered
oracles, often unclear and always unargued. Like the answers to specific
questions provided by the urim and thummim, these usually have to do
with policy, not law. They are pronouncements about the future, warn-
ings and foretellings, not legal rulings. Still, biblical law was worked out
by people who believed in the warnings as well as the rulings, who had a
sense of God's mysterious immediacy that was largely lost by the
rabbinic age. The rabbis, some of them anyway, were openly skeptical
about the possibility and even the desirability of divine intervention in
their decision-making.
Mind-set aside, however, laws-with-reasons are not mysterious.
Whether they are aimed at fellow or rival lawmakers or at ordinary citi-
zens, they aim to persuade. From this aim, two things seem to follow
about the biblical understanding of the law. First of all, this is not in any
simple sense a legal positivist understanding. No doubt, God's law is
authoritative because God is omnipotent, the sovereign of the universe.
But no particular rendition or interpretation of the law is authoritative
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for this reason. Legal positivism "works" only when sovereign power is
regularly and visibly deployed. But God's deployments, despite his
omnipotence, are irregular and usually invisible. Hence his authority is
effectively taken over by Israel's secret legislators. None of them (since
the king is excluded) possess anything like sovereign power, and so they
are led to think about the law as something that requires argument.
And if there are arguments, there must also be standards to which the
arguments appeal. Justified law implies the previous existence of ideas
about justification-in the case of civil and criminal law, of ideas about
justice. It appears that God himself is bound by these ideas, as Abraham
tells him at Sodom: "Shall not the judge of all earth deal justly?" (Gene-
sis 18:25). If God's power does not make law authoritative, neither does
his righteousness make it just. The biblical writers were also not moral
positivists. Moses' boast in Deuteronomy about the value of Israelite law
carries the same implication as Abraham's rebuke: though the law is
divinely delivered, divinely commanded, it does not determine but only
realizes what is right. Or, alternatively, fails to realize what is right: for
it is always possible that the reasons given for this or that law will be
disputed-though never explicitly.
The effect of these disputes is, again, to pluralize the law. Old laws are
not canceled, but rather new laws or revised versions of old ones are
added. I have already suggested that the alternative process of replace-
ment rather than addition characterizes other Near Eastern legal codes.
Only among the Hittites, apparently, are the replacements made explicit
(and only in a code without the usual royal preamble, perhaps designed
for the use of jurists): "If someone blinds a free man or knocks out his
teeth, formerly he would give one mina of silver, now he gives twenty
shekels of silver and pledges his estate as security."17 No reasons for the
change are given, either because ordinary Hittites had no need to know
or because the legislative authority of the king or his judges was never in
question. A lone passage in the book of Ruth (4:7-"Now this was for-
merly done in Israel .... ") reproduces the Hittite formula, though in the
context of a case rather than a code. For the rest, additions and revisions
are unacknowledged, and so, as with the Hittites, though perhaps for
different reasons, mostly unjustified. We have to reconstruct the argu-
ments that were probably made on the basis of justifications offered in
other cases. But there is one very nice example of an addition with rea-
sons attached.
In Exodus 21:2-6, it is required that a Hebrew slave be set free in the
seventh year of his servitude. He shall "go out free, without payment."
The law is repeated in Deuteronomy with an important addition:
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When you send him free do not let him go away empty handed.
Furnish him out of the flock and threshing floor, and out of your
wine press which the Lord your God has blessed you, you shall give
him. Remember that you were slaves in the land of Egypt.
The historical reference is especially appropriate here since the Israelites
did not "go away empty" from Egypt (see Exodus 12:35-36). Surely they
should behave toward their own kinfolk at least as well as the Egyptians
behaved toward them. But this argument was apparently not entirely
convincing, for the Deuteronomic authors add another: "It shall not
seem hard for you when you set him free . . for he has been worth a
double hired servant to you . . ." (15:18). Legal revisionism clearly
involved economic as well as historical arguments.
Sometimes, it seems, these are also arguments of the sort that we
would call ideological, arguments that reflect religious/political disagree-
ments of a systematic kind. The slavery laws of Deuteronomy, for exam-
ple, are clearly intended to improve the status of women, though the
improvements are neither clearly marked out nor explicitly defended.
The six year limit, from which women were excepted in the Exodus code,
now covers them in exactly the same way as men are covered. Male and
female slaves are to be similarly treated, though nothing is said against
their dissimilar treatment in times past. An even more intriguing exam-
ple of what has been called Deuteronomy's "feminism" is the revision of
the Tenth Commandment. This is the Exodus version:
You shall not covet your neighbor's house, you shall not covet your
neighbor's wife, nor his manservant nor his maidservant, nor his ox,
nor his ass, nor anything that is your neighbor's (20:14).
And this is the Deuteronomic version:
Neither shall you desire your neighbor's wife. You shall not covet
your neighbor's house, his field, or his manservant, or his maidser-
vant, or his ox, or his ass, or anything that is your neighbor's (5:21).
In the revised commandment, the wife is set apart, deliberately taken out
of the list of possessions, assigned, as it were, a verb of her own. Again,
no reason is given for the small but significant change; if there was a
protest, as by the daughters of Zelophehad, we are told nothing about it.
This, the text insists, is what God really commanded at Sinai. But it
seems obvious that someone reading the earlier version of what God
commanded did not like it. We can only imagine what he, or she, said to
his, or her, fellow legislators.
VI
The existence of three codes means that Israel's legal tradition was
pluralist in character, encompassing (with what degree of strain we do
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not know) argument and disagreement. The "predilection for justified
law" enables us to see what the arguments were probably like even if we
cannot be sure of the settings in which they were made or of the people
involved. Ancient Israel does not appear to have had any very developed
conception of citizenship. The biblical texts provide no doctrinal defense
of-they hardly seem to take an interest in-political participation. But
there clearly was a "participatory" legal culture. I do not mean, neces-
sarily, a culture of litigation, though access to the courts appears to have
been easy and the judges fairly busy if not always fair in their business.
The frequency with which they are criticized by the prophets suggests
the everyday importance of their decisions. So does the commandment
that comes at the very beginning of Deuteronomy, set apart from all the
others: "You shall not be partial; but you will hear out high and low
alike" (1:17). Babylonian and Egyptian judges were probably similarly
enjoined; they do not seem, however, to have had to listen to anything
quite like a jeremiad when they failed to live up to their responsibilities.
But for our purposes here, litigation and judicial integrity are less impor-
tant than legislation and interpretive authority.
Here is what gives Israel's legal culture its distinctive-and, I might
add, its enduring--character. From fairly early, a significant number of
people, virtually the whole of the nation's intelligentsia, such as it was,
and some subset of its ordinary members, were engaged in arguing about
the law. The fact that they assigned their arguments to God we can take
as piety or as presumption. Either way, the assignment legitimized their
own activity. In principle they were articulating the content of the Sinai
covenant; in practice they were deciding-more than once-what that
content should be. Certainly, the decision-making process was political
(and moral) as well as legal. But it was never understood or defended in
political terms. Nor are procedures specified by which individuals were
admitted to the process. Priests were born to their tasks, but there were
many priests, and some of them obviously played a greater role than
others. Judges were appointed by the king, but the texts also suggest that
the elders of the people, chosen, perhaps, by the people, served at least in
the local courts. Prophets were called by God, but we have only their
own accounts of their calling. About the scribes, we know nothing at all.
These are the people I have called the secret legislators of Israel-an
elite, no doubt, but a very loosely structured elite, whose covenantal/
legal consciousness was probably not entirely different from that of the
nation-at-large.
The looseness of the structure had something to do with the tripleness
of the codes-and both of these had something to do with a divine singu-
larity that could not be imitated or even authoritatively represented any-
where in Israelite society. None of this, needless to say, gave rise to a
pluralist doctrine. No biblical writer argued for the legitimacy of rival
[Vol. 4: 33 5
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interpreters or of rival interpretations of the law. But as a group, the
writers (authors, editors, scribes) left behind in the canonical texts a leg-
acy of multiple and inconsistent codes and a record of unacknowledged
interpretations and revisions. For reasons about which we can only spec-
ulate, they chose to live with this multiplicity, rejecting the two possible
resolutions: serial replacement and editorial harmonization. The result
of their choice was a written law that made possible those strange, open-
ended legal conversations and arguments that constituted the oral law of
later Judaism.
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